Mar 31, 2009

Security in the workspace - Part 3

It seems that we will have to learn to live and work in a de-perimeterized world. Acceptance of the problem is often the first step towards a solution. So, what alternatives to perimeter defense are there? And what is the impact of these alternatives on the future workspace and vice versa? Below are some thoughts. I hesitate to call these conclusions. Please consider these as starting points for a discussion.
  • Defense in depth is the complete opposite of perimeter defense (when considering the location where controls are implemented). This security principle advises to apply multiple layers of security controls, so that if one layer fails other layers take over.
    • Unfortunately, complete defense in depth is increasingly expensive as it is difficult to maintain,
    • and because too many layers of security get in the way. (Is there a usabilty vs security trade-off? I'm not sure. But usability is probably not helped with adding multiple layers of security.)

  • Most experts see a shift from perimeter defense (and other location based defenses) to data oriented security. (Perhaps that should be information oriented security?)
    • Because of the multiple contexts in which employees now process data, this requires some sort of watermarking of sensitive and valuable data. If, for example, lost information can be tracked back to employees responsible for that information than those employees can be held accountable for the loss. But wasn't DRM declared dead?
    • Moreover, data oriented security makes valuation of information necessary: relative sensitivity and value to the organization should be made explicit. Valuation of assets should be done anyway (as part of information risk management), but that doesn't mean that it is easy, cheap or common practice today!
    • Related to the above point: information should be stored and processed with a clear goal in mind (for reasons of Governance, Regulations, Complicance). This is at least as difficult as valuation.

  • Accountability (the other A-word) may be an alternative to access control. Access control is somewhat problematic in the absence of a perimeter after all. Access control is expensive in the future workspace since employees join and leave the organization on a more regular basis (access credentials management is costly). Accountability certainly seems to be more compatible with the greater responsibility given to employees as part of the future workspace trends.

  • Identity management is necessary, as accountability usually means a great deal of logging (of actions of employees). Logging obviously requires the capability to distinguish between employees (try holding individuals accountable for their actions when you can't tell them apart). However, since we left the perimeter behind us, we can't rely on the classical identity management process which involves provisioning, authentication, and authorization.
    • The provisioning problem could be overcome if we could use an established identity provider's infrastructure which extends beyond the bounds of the organization. The existing identity provider (I'm thinking of national governments) has the infrastructure for issuing authentication means to individuals already in place. If such a global identity provider is not (yet) possible, federated identity management and user-centric identity management may be alternatives (in the mean time).
    • Authentication has to be done decentralized (in absense of a perimeter with check points) and preferably as often as possible yet also as unobtrusive as possible. Perhaps context-information could help here?
    • Authorization, on the other hand, is better done centralized so as to achieve consistent rules which are easy to manage. Well-defined roles could be useful here
Other points? Leave a comment!

No comments:

Post a Comment